Willem Noë, a Dutch macroeconomist, worked as a European Commission official for more than 32 years. His work focused mainly on globalisation issues, the economies of several Member States, foremost dealing with EU enlargement. At CIFE, Willem Noë teaches EU enlargement within the Master in Applied European Policy and Governance Studies (EUGOV).
The focus of your course within the EUGOV Master was on EU enlargement. How would you describe the current mood in Brussels with regard to this topic?
Historically speaking, EU enlargement has politically never been very popular in the EU, with the exception perhaps of the 2004 EU enlargement wave as mainly Southern / Eastern European countries joined, accompanied by a real sense of historical 'reunification of Europe'. After Romania and Bulgaria joined as well in 2007, it was largely followed by a period of stagnation on all sides, with only Croatia joining in 2013. At the same time, the unpopularity is quite paradoxical as historically it is arguably the EU's most powerful and successful EU foreign policy instrument.
However, given the current alarming and shifting geopolitical situation, above all the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, but also the US no longer being a stable or reliable partner, adding to rising economic insecurity, there is now an strong political perception of urgency and momentum in Brussels regarding the enlargement process. The focus is especially on Ukraine and Moldova but certainly encompasses Western Balkan countries as well.
Noteworthy as well, and similarly linked to the geopolitical unrest, is that Iceland will soon be holding a referendum to re-open accession negotiations after breaking them off earlier on in 2015 while in Norway political leaders have started to discuss the possibility of (finally) joining the EU, too.
Why has EU enlargement become such an important topic again in recent years?
The aforementioned developments of high geopolitical stresses are perhaps a good example of the old political adage that nothing unites more than the perception of a common enemy, and on the side of the EU once again a recognition that enlargement is not an optional tool or benevolent act towards candidate countries, but an essential strategy and necessity, a key driver of long-term sustainable security, peace, stability, rule of law, democracy and economic growth in Europe. All this has been underlined by the European Commission, Council and European Parliament. Enlargement - historically in parallel with (and reinforcing) deepening EU integration - has enabled the EU to strengthen collective governance, internalise and mitigate external risks and reinforce its global voice and influence.
Looking at the EU–Western Balkans Summit, that just concluded in Montenegro, which aspects do you count as a real sign of progress on enlargement?
The fact that the most important annual political meeting between the EU and the region was held for the first time in Montenegro is of course no coincidence but is meant as a political symbol and acknowledgement of strong progress made by Montenegro in the accession process. In his summit conclusions, the European Council President António Costa affirmed the 2028 enlargement horizon for Montenegro, noted the strong progress of Albania, the Serbian government's presentation of a calendar to complete electoral law and judiciary reforms (following earlier severe backsliding on democratic standards), and the recent opening of negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. Other positive elements of the summit were the Franco-German proposals to allow candidate countries to gradually integrate EU institutions, decision-making processes and the Single Market before becoming full members, and to let the Council ‘automatically’ move forward with the opening of all relevant negotiation clusters following a Commission recommendation to do so.
All this should send a positive message to the other Western Balkan pre-accession candidates as well. At the same time, the conclusions did not mention Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia, where the political situation remains difficult, and Serbia-Kosovo relations remain as fraught as ever.
Many Western Balkan countries have been waiting for years. How can the EU maintain credibility in the enlargement process?
The 'waiting for years' is in the first instance a result of a lack of political will of several Western Balkan pre-accession candidates to effectively push through the required but often politically challenging structural changes to align with the acquis communautaire or body of EU law. This remains a key membership requirement and has shown to be particularly difficult in the areas of rule of law, judiciary and public administration reform, in clear contrast for instance with the commitment of (most) Eastern and Central European countries in the 2004/2007 enlargement round, where regime change was generally much more profound. However, at the same time, in the EU itself after the 2004/2007 enlargement wave there was often little political commitment to and interest in further EU expansion, regularly referred to as 'enlargement fatigue', while still professing the importance of EU enlargement. Of course, the pre-accession countries noted this lack of consistent and serious support, feeding a mutual negative feedback loop.
Now of course the situation has changed dramatically, and the Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos has rightly emphasised that the current 'classical' – very complex and slow – method of EU enlargement is no longer 'fit for purpose'. Several Member States, including Germany, seem to agree the process needs to be simplified and sped up – without undermining the merit-based assessment of meeting the basic requirements set in the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership.
What does this mean concretely?
In the last few years there have been several proposals for ‘staged/phased’ accession, including offering candidate countries advanced integration benefits like limited access to the single market and to structural funds. Another idea – although recently rejected by Member States – was 'reversed’ membership notably for Ukraine, essentially a membership ‘on probation’. A German proposal for Ukraine to gain ‘associate’ membership – essentially, representation in EU institutions without voting rights as a step to fully joining the EU, was rejected both by Ukraine and several Member States. In addition, to simplify and speed up the enlargement procedure, there have been calls to move away from the Member State unanimity requirement for opening/closing of each negotiation chapter, towards QMV (Qualified Majority Voting) or, more radically, by 'reverse' QMV: the Commission rather than the Council approving the opening/closing of specific chapters unless the Council blocks this with a QMV.
These proposals have many advantages, as they would provide stronger and more immediate incentives to tackle difficult reforms, help familiarise with EU practices and procedures, build mutual understanding and confidence, and show EU commitment while reducing risks for existing Member States, as candidate countries' inclusion can be reversed. While Member States remain cautious, there is definitely a sense that 'business as usual' in the enlargement process is no longer tenable. The fact that such proposals are now seriously discussed is a good sign, part of the EU often getting quite creative around crisis.
Montenegro recently moved a step closer in accession talks. Could 2026 become a breakthrough year for at least one candidate country?
Indeed, for two candidate countries 2026 has already been a breakthrough year. The EU recently started the preparation of a Draft Accession Treaty for Montenegro, a major step and political sign of confidence on both sides that Montenegro can indeed fulfill its ambition to become the 28th Member State by 2028. The draft treaty is technically prepared in parallel with the final stage of the negotiation process and is then finalised after all negotiating chapters have been closed.
At the same time, progress in Albania is following closely behind, and the country was very recently assessed as having met the interim rule of law benchmarks in cluster 1: fundamentals – the cluster of negotiation chapters covering the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform and rule of law chapters. Negotiations on this cluster are the first to be opened and the last to be closed, and progress under this cluster determines the overall pace of negotiations. Together with Montenegro it is only the second candidate country to do so, a major step forward meaning it can now move towards closing negotiation chapters.
What are the biggest challenges currently facing Ukraine and Moldova on their path towards EU membership?
Leaving aside the obvious issues of Ukraine being still at war and both countries having territory militarily occupied by Russia, I think the main challenges for Ukraine would include concerns on the large population size, its massive agricultural area and perceived high corruption, with the latter as well for (much smaller) Moldova. However, the Ukrainian population size and agricultural challenges are similar to that of Poland at the time, although the agricultural issues are admittedly on a larger scale. Corruption levels in Ukraine and Moldova are at levels similar to Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary at the start of their negotiations, and to Western Balkan countries. Here, Ukraine has already made significant strides in anticorruption institutions and has strong domestic civil society co-ownership, but vulnerabilities remain. For Moldova, despite formal progress, critical reform implementation is currently still stalled, and for both there is still a way to go to meet EU standards.
Is the EU prepared institutionally and politically for a larger Union in the near future?
This has always been a tricky debate for the Member States, and current discussions on the necessity and possibilities of institutional reform linked to EU enlargement range from quite pessimistic to wholly optimistic. In the past, EU enlargements and reforms have been companions, with reform of EU institutions and policies presented as an indispensable corollary of an enlarged Union. This logic has not changed. In the current constellation I tend to be more on the positive side re Member States' more rapid acceptance of reform unavoidability with the coming enlargements. Montenegro and Albania are expected to join as new Member States in the next few years and the Council has repeatedly expressed strong political commitment and support to Ukraine as a candidate country literally fighting for its existential sovereignty and EU membership aspirations. While it is unclear how and when exactly the latter is going to take place, reform pressure cannot (any longer) be used as an excuse for Member States to deny/postpone EU entry. Such an action would be highly damaging to those countries and to the EU itself. However, it cannot be taken for granted either, especially with the rise of right-wing movements in Member States and in the EP.
At CIFE, you teach the future generation of EU policymakers. What do you personally take out of it?
After a long career at the European Commission, it remains a real pleasure and privilege to share both practical and theoretical knowledge and insights with young students. My aim is to provide a hopefully interesting and useful multi-dimensional narrative on the EU that helps them in their studies and coming careers. And it also gives me an extra incentive to keep abreast of all the latest developments regarding the EU of course!