The EU’s Neighbourhood: "Close, Connected and Critical"

Kate Ezard
9 November 2026 | Issue No. 199

Kate Ezard is a former student of CIFE.

Introduction

“The Arctic is undergoing rapid and far-reaching transformation, with growing implications for European security and stability” – opening statement from the first European Arctic Summit, 13-14^th September 2026.

Historically regions of terrae incognitae, the Arctic is undergoing a rapid contemporary transformation, driven by three megatrends: climate change, globalisation, and power shifts.  Firstly, rising global temperatures caused by human activity are melting Arctic Sea ice, with temperatures in the region rising four times faster than the global average.  Secondly, loss of Arctic Sea ice is opening up access to untapped resources like oil, natural gas and minerals, in addition to creating opportunities for maritime trade routes. Both the reserves of natural resources and emerging sea-lanes are resulting, thirdly, in increased interest and competition in the Arctic region from great powers.

In September 2026, EU leaders gathered in Rovaniemi, Finland for the first-ever European Arctic Summit. Recognising the Arctic’s growing geopolitical significance, the Summit aimed to strengthen the EU’s common strategic approach to the region. Writing on X, European Council President António Costa stressed the need for a “joint European response and coordinated action” on challenges in the region, which include climate change, resilience, and security.  Concerns about security are nothing new, but the EU has a particularly keen eye on the Arctic region for two main reasons. The first is Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. The former boasts the world’s largest Arctic coastline, and with it the power to reshape the region’s strategic environment in a manner that is hostile to EU interests. The second is increased security policy interest from China. Both factors translate to a surge in great power competition in the region, creating an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment that is intensified by the accelerated impacts of Arctic climate change.

From scientific diplomacy to security dilemma

European Arctic engagement was originally steeped in scientific and climate diplomacy, but in 2008 the EU began developing and published its first comprehensive and integrated Arctic Policy. The previous year two Russian Arctic explorers had planted a Russian flag on the North Pole seabed, prompting an international media narrative focused on a “scramble” for the Arctic.  Before this date, only Norway had an Arctic policy, launched in 2005. The following period 2010-13 saw the publication of Arctic policies from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark – the EU’s three Arctic states – as well as Iceland, Canada, and the United States. These seven countries, in addition to Russia, make up the world’s eight Arctic states. Close relationships to, terrestrial presence in or strategic partnership with seven out of the eight elucidates the EU’s entanglement in Arctic affairs.

Finland, Sweden, and Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands) serve as the EU’s Arctic gateway, extending the EU’s acquis communautaire across an extensive geographical area of the Arctic Circle. They also justify the EU’s presence and engagement in the Arctic region. The EU’s 2021 Arctic policy identified three main interests in Europe’s northern flank: firstly, serving its own strategic interests as a geopolitical power; secondly, ensuring the region remains safe, peaceful, and prosperous; and thirdly, sharing the responsibility for global sustainable development. Although not excluded from mention, security and defence was not underscored as a key policy area.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shattered the relative stability of the post-Cold War Arctic, ending an era of “Arctic exceptionalism” and paralysing the Arctic Council, the region’s preeminent forum for polar cooperation. Moscow’s war has fundamentally altered diplomacy in the wider north, rendering the EU’s Arctic policy inconsistent with current strategic realities. Growing Russian militarisation, coupled with interest from non-Arctic state actors like China has intensified structural rivalries and pressures in what is becoming an increasingly complex and fast-evolving region. It is within this dual context of interstate power competition and an environment increasingly vulnerable to climate change that the Arctic has transformed into a significant area of state security and defence policy.

The EU is not the only actor to have developed an Arctic policy of its own. Beijing unveiled its first Arctic Strategy in 2018, becoming the first non-Arctic state to do so, and designating itself a “near-Arctic state”. The EU does not agree with this declaration. It is wary of China’s expanding polar footprint: its regional military presence is increasing, as are its investments in strategic infrastructure. What concerns the EU most however is China’s fiscal-military cooperation with Russia, which it worries risks undermining regional stability as well as European access to strategic resources. Therefore power competition, as well as vulnerability concerns, have led the EU to increasingly frame China as a strategic competitor and link Arctic security to broader economic security debates. 

As such, the European Commission recognised the need to publish an updated Arctic strategy that reflects the EU’s changed priorities and is consistent with current strategic realities in the Arctic. An updated Arctic strategy was unveiled on 20th October 2026 in the form of a Joint Communication between the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. Fundamentally, it lays out a new Northern Neighbourhood framework for policy cooperation with the EU’s northern neighbours and partners, listing four priorities: security, climate, economy and people. Unsurprisingly, security sits at its core.

Security through economic resilience

Since the 2010s, the EU has pursued a policy of “strategic autonomy”, growing its resilience and capacity to act autonomously in key policy areas. Traditionally, it has focused on boosting strategic autonomy through economic resilience in the defence, energy, digital infrastructure, and supply chain sectors. This policy is tied to the idea of reducing the EU’s dependence on China – “derisking”. The Arctic’s vast sum of resources are essential to achieving this goal and securitising the EU’s energy security, green and digital transitions, and industrial competitiveness.

The EU is exploring several different avenues. As Russian energy supplies are no longer a viable basis for European security, the EU has pushed investment in floating storage and regasification units, particularly in Norway’s Barents Sea. This aims to diversify supply sources as well as widen potential suppliers and market opportunities. It is also exploring renewable energy exports and green hydrogen potential in Iceland and Greenland.

Economic resilience also requires protecting critical infrastructure, such as demonstrated on these three occasions: Denmark’s blocking of the proposed 2016 purchase of Greenland’s Grønnedal naval base; Finland’s 2018 decision to block the purchase of Kemijärvi Airport near a military zone; and Norway’s 2024 decision to halt the sale of Søre Fagerfjord to Chinese buyers. Clearly, there is growing concern at EU level over foreign investment in strategically sensitive Arctic locations.

Similarly, in April 2019 the EU adopted an Investment Screening Framework, with additional sectors identified for “safeguard investigations” earlier in 2026. It reflects efforts to scrutinise foreign direct investment more closely: the EU is only too aware of its structural trade deficit with China which reached €359.3 billion in 2025, further intensifying concerns over economic dependence. 

Digital infrastructure is also central to EU strategic autonomy. Investment in European 5G infrastructure has reduced Huawei’s digital presence, while Polar Connect, Vision 2030 and the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable aim to strengthen trans-Arctic connectivity between Greenland, Iceland, Europe and East Asia. The EU’s updated Arctic strategy builds on these initiatives through a proposed Maritime Security Hub, including an Arctic Cable Hub to monitor, protect and repair undersea cables, and IRIS Arctic Connectivity to provide secure satellite communications for government use. These will complement existing enhanced satellite surveillance initiatives Copernicus and Galileo, seeking to reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen digital sovereignty and improve Arctic surveillance and security. Combined with diversified critical raw material supply chains, they could reinforce the EU’s economic resilience and capacity to act in the Arctic.

Security through partnerships

Economic resilience alone, however, cannot guarantee Arctic security. The region’s changing security environment post-2022 has forced the EU to pay greater attention to strategic partnerships and its own role as a security actor.
The EU has already demonstrated growing attention to Arctic defence through military exercises, including Arctic Challenge 2023 and the Danish-led Arctic Light 2025, and has committed to expand its icebreaker capacity. The UK is a particularly relevant defence partner: despite institutional and strategic constraints following Brexit, both share interests in Arctic security, identified as “central” in the UK’s 2019 Arctic Defence Strategy.  The 2025 UK-EU Defence and Security Partnership provides a springboard for strengthened cooperation in maritime security, hybrid threats, and critical infrastructure resilience; similarly, the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent in the GIUK Gap and participation in the Joint Expeditionary Force also offer potential foundations for closer cooperation.

Canada is another increasingly important partner. The EU–Canada Security and Defence Partnership, signed in June 2025, provides the framework for enhanced cooperation on defence, security and resilience. The German company TKMS, for example, was chosen in July 2026 as the supplier for Canada’s largest ever defence procurement of submarines to “detect, track, deter and … defeat adversaries”, including in the Arctic.  Furthermore, in her State of the Union address last month, Ursula von der Leyen proposed opening the way for Canada to become the EU’s first associate member, envisioning closer integration across critical sectors. She further reinforced the EU’s desire to partner with Canada in a LinkedIn post celebrating the Union’s updated Arctic strategy. 

Crucially, these partnerships could also offer opportunities to strengthen European resilience and Arctic security without relying exclusively on US – and NATO – guarantees. Whilst the accession of both Finland and Sweden to NATO in 2023-4 has strengthened the alliance’s northern presence, the strategic partnership remains plagued by EU uncertainty over US security commitments. America’s priorities, laid out in the US National Defence Strategy of January 2026, have shifted away from Europe, reducing the Old Continent to tertiary importance (after domestic and Indo-Pacific engagements, respectively). Tensions within the NATO alliance remain over fiscal responsibilities due to American retrenchment and US demands for increased allied burden-sharing. Anxieties are also high over Greenland following Trump’s annexation rhetoric at the start of the year, in addition to disagreement among some EU allies to support Washington’s military intervention in Iran.

Although Arctic security has traditionally focused on threats from Russia, and increasingly China, uncertainty over US commitments presents a new challenge from within the alliance itself. Despite this, NATO and US forces remain essential to deterring Russian activity in the North Atlantic, particularly given Germany’s warning that Russia could attack NATO by 2029.  The EU therefore has a strategic interest in sustaining transatlantic cooperation while strengthening its own capacity to act. Accordingly, the 2026 Northern Neighbourhood framework seeks to deepen security cooperation with Member States and Arctic partners, complementing rather than replacing NATO’s role in deterrence and collective defence.

Conclusion

The Arctic is no longer a remote peripheral region. Increasing militarisation, environmental changes, resource lust and power play in the High North have cemented the Arctic as a region of EU strategic interest. Evolving considerably from early environmental engagement to policy institutionalisation after 2008, EU engagement in Arctic affairs continues to grow as the region – affected disproportionately by climate change – becomes an increasingly prominent area of interstate competition. The EU’s approach to strategic autonomy has likewise evolved, prioritising both economic resilience and security partnerships. To strengthen its Arctic position, the EU must continue securing energy supplies, digital infrastructure, and supply chains while developing its defence capacities through Member States and robust international partnerships, including NATO. Efforts made in these areas could strengthen European resilience and enhance the EU’s profile as a security actor in an increasingly fragmented international order.

The EU’s updated Arctic strategy of 20^th October 2026 marks an important development, placing security and resilience at the centre of a new Northern Neighbourhood framework. Initiatives such as the Maritime Security Hub, Pan-Arctic Cable and IRIS Arctic Connectivity, combined with expanded icebreaker capacity, aims to reduce strategic vulnerabilities and strengthen the Union’s ability to operate in its northernmost flank. Will it be successful in creating a stronger, more independent and resilient European Union? This will depend on three factors: its ability to translate these ambitions into practical, credible defence capabilities; sustained and effective cooperation with Arctic partners; and proactively complementing NATO’s vital role in the EU’s regional security.

References

¹ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2154896X.2022.2058216#d1e177
² https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap-oa/book/9781035344956/chapter1.xml
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⁸https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ursula-von-der-leyen_we-have-just-adopted-our-new-arctic-share-7518309262243057664-LPRV/
⁹ https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c62v63gl8rvo