

in collaboration with,



with contributions from

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**

# SUMMER UNIVERSITY OF TURKEY

## The Relations between Europe and Turkey

### REPORT OF THE SESSION

The « Centre International de Formation Européenne » organized the Summer university in Istanbul, from July 15<sup>th</sup> to August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009, on the topic :

«The relations between the European Union and Turkey»

This session was a great success as well regarding the academic programme as the group of students who share together from the first day and showing immediately a great interest for the different offered activities.

Courses (**Annex I**, detailed program) were held at Istanbul Bilgi University, a very famous Turkish University in a good localisation of Istanbul and gathered about 40 students coming from all over the world representing 12 different countries (**Annex II** : participants). The Turkish students mixed immediately with students from abroad to help them move in the town.

Courses contained teaching of approximately 50 hours, some “exploration visits” to permit to the students to prepare, with separate groups, a presentation about each visit”(Annexe III : Reports of some of the exploration visits), and a simulation game (Annexe IV : Presentation of the simulation) by a council of Ministers meeting speaking about “ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS : The financial crisis . The courses were held in English by 20 lecturers, experts and high personalities from Western Europe as well as from Turkey. A feedback was proposed at the end of each week to evaluate the global satisfaction of the students.

Furthermore, participants enjoyed a rich cultural and touristic program to discover Istanbul and its surroundings.

At the end of the session, students having successfully participated in the program received a “certificate of participation”. Moreover, some of them chose to acquire ECTS Credits and presented some additional work after the session.

An evaluation questionnaire (**Annex V** : Evaluation of the session) was given to each student at the end of the session enabling the organizers to get an idea of the general level of satisfaction and to have some elements for reflection for following sessions. All the students seem to have appreciated the session even if some positive remarks will permit to improve the next sessions.

This Turkish Summer University was organized for the second time in partnership with ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY, and with the financial support of Robert Bosch Stiftung and the European Union



# ANNEXE I : PROGRAMME

## First Week

**Wednesday, July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

Arrival of the students  
Accommodation at the dormitory

**Thursday, July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30: Opening session and Presentation of the partners

- **Dr. Senem Aydın Düzgit**,  
İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute
- **Mme Marie-France Perdigon**,  
Centre International de Formation  
Européenne, Director of the Summer  
University Programme
- Presentation of the logistics details of  
accommodation and stay  
**Suna Gökçe** and **Ayşe Tecmen**,  
European Institute



11.00 Presentation of the programme

**Laurent Baechler**, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, IEP Paris

Proposed “exploration topics” and constitution of the groups  
(about 8 students)

13.30: *Guided visit of Istanbul and start of the exploration series :*  
Phanar Patriarchy



**Friday, July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 - 12.30: *EU History*  
**Prof. Dr. Hartmut Marhold** (Germany)  
Director General, Centre International de  
Formation Européenne, University of Cologne



13.30 - 16.30: **EU Polity**  
- Institutions  
- Decision making  
- EU law  
**Edgar Lenski** (Germany),  
Federal Ministry for Economy.



**Saturday, July 18<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 - 12.30: **EU Internal Policies : Common Market and Monetary Union**  
**Jacques Le Cacheux**, University of Pau, OFCE, Paris,  
France - College of Europe

13.30 - 16.30: **State, Society and Culture in Turkey**  
**Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**, İstanbul Bilgi University,  
Director of the European Institute, Department of  
International Relations

**ORAL FEEDBACK OF THE FIRST WEEK**

**Sunday, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2009:**  
**Excursion along the Bosphorus**  
**to the Black Sea.**



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Second Week

**Monday, July 20th, 2009**

- 9.30 - 12.00: *EU External Policies : Enlargement*  
**Prof. Dr. François Bafail** (France), Directeur de recherches CNRS, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, CERI, Paris
- 13.00 - 16.00: *EU External Policies : CFSP*  
**Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp**(Germany), Director, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
- 16.00: *Guided visit and exploration series (II) in smaller groups:*  
Blue Mosque



**Tuesday, July 21st, 2009**

- 9.30 - 12.30: *EU Internal Policies : “European Social Model”, Sustainable Development*  
**Dr. Laurent Baechler** (France), Institut d'Etudes Politiques, IEP Paris
- 13.30 - 16.30: *The origins of EU- Turkey Relations*  
**Dr. Senem Aydın Düzgit**, İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute
- 16.30: *An Introduction about the Bosch Foundation*  
Dr. Bettina Berns, Program Director, Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH
- 19.00: Visit to Central University. Cocktail for the students

**Wednesday, July 22nd, 2009**

- 9.30 - 12.30: *Westernisation in Turkish Politics*  
**Asst. Prof. Dr. Boğaç Erozan**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Department of International Relations
- 13.30h - 16.30: Debate I *Turkey and Democracy*  
Participants: **Beken Saatçioğlu**, Department of Politics, University of Virginia

**Thursday, July 23rd, 2009**

- 9.30 - 12.30: *Civil-military Relations*  
**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serhat Güvenç**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Department of International Relations
- 13.30 - 15.30: *Guided visit and exploration series (III) in smaller groups :* Armenian Patriarchy

**Friday, July 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

- 9.30 - 12.30: Round Table I : *EU as a Moving Target for Candidate States: Deepening, Enlargement and “Absorption Capacity”*  
Round table with the participation of:
- **Andrew Duff**, MEP, Vice President of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee
  - **Joost Lagendijk**, Former Chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Senior advisor at the Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University.
  - **Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels**, (Germany) Jean Monnet Chair of Political Sciences, University of Cologne
  - **Dr. Senem Aydın Düzgit**, İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute

13.30 - 15.30: Debate II *Diversity and Citizenship*  
Participants: **Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Director of the European Institute, Department of International Relations

**Saturday, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2009:**

9.30- 12.30: *Human Rights in Turkey*  
**Dr. İdil Işıl Gül**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Law Faculty

**ORAL FEEDBACK OF THE SECOND WEEK**

Afternoon: *Guided visit and exploration series (IV) in smaller groups*  
Alevi Communion

**Sunday, July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2009; Excursion to Princess Islands**



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Third Week

**Monday, July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 - 12.30: *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East and Asia*  
**Prof. Dr. Gencer Özcan**, Yıldız Technical University, Department of International Relations

13.30 - 16.30: Round Table II *EU - Turkey Relations*  
Round table discussion with the participation of:

- Moderator: **Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Director of the European Institute, Department of International Relations;
- **Zeynep Göğüş**, Euractiv and Hürriyet, Journalist;
- **Alain Servantie**, DG Enlargement- European Commission
- **Dr Bahadır Kalegasi**, International Coordinator TUSIAD - Turkish Industry & Business Association, Representation to the EU and BUSINESSEUROPE, Brussels

**Tuesday, July 28<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 -12.30: Debate III *Euroscepticism*  
Participants: **Özge Onursal**, İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Department of International Relations;

13.30: *Guided visit and exploration series (V) in smaller groups*  
Tarlabasi Community Center in Taksim

**Wednesday, July 29<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 -12.30: *Europe in the long run: Where do we go?*  
**Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**, İstanbul Bilgi University



13.30 - 16.30: Debate IV *Istanbul as an Urban Landscape: Historical, Cultural and Political Aspects*  
Participants: **Prof. Dr. Alan Duben**, İstanbul Bilgi University, Department of Sociology

**Thursday, July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

9.30 - 13.00: *Presentations of the guided visits and explorations*  
(Oral presentation with slides of the 5 explorations). *The students will also have to write a paper about their presentation and send it either at the end of the session either two weeks after (about 2000 words)*



Afternoon **OPTIONAL: Oral Exams (for ECTS Credits)**  
*Free afternoon for others*

**Friday, July 31st, 2009**

9.30 - 12.30: **Methodological and thematic introduction to simulation**

**Ms. Gesa-Stefanie Brincker**, Research Associate, Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE) and IEP Berlin

**Mr. Severin Fischer**, Research Associate, Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), Berlin

**SEMINAR TOPIC:** Simulation of a Council of Ministers meeting

**ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS:** The financial crisis and beyond: Debating the EU's financial contribution to economic recovery - investing in energy infrastructure for a low carbon future?



13.30 - 16.30: **Simulation: Preparation**

First phase of group work:

Preparation and drafting of position papers by each delegation

All participants



**Saturday, August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009:**

9.30 - 13.30: **Simulation**

1. Table ronde – Presentation of positions  
(about 5 minutes by each delegation)

*All participants*

2. Simulation Negotiation

*All participants*

14.30: **Simulation: Conclusions**

**De-briefing: evaluation of simulation**

**Ms. Gesa-Stefanie Brincker**, Research Associate, CIFE and IEP Berlin

**Mr. Severin Fischer**, Research Associate, IEP, Berlin



16.00: **General assessment of the Summer University**

Evaluation with Marie-France PERDIGON  
and Laurent BAECHLER

**FEEDBACK OF THE SESSION**

Official Closing session





Distribution of the certificates



20.00: Closing dinner with all the students and staff



## PARTICIPANTS

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


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


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Izmir University of Economics,  
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## EXPLORATION VISITS

During all the session, the students were shared into 5 groups (about 8 students by group) and worked on the following topics :

### Laicité in Turkey :

LUETZIG Fabian (Germany)  
CANTEKİN Kayahan (Turkey)  
YILMAZ Ferhat (Turkey)  
BOUZEMBRAK Linda (France)  
IOANNOU Vasilis (Greece)  
GÜLEN Berkay (Turkey)  
ÇÖREKOĞLU Barbaros (Turkey)  
KUEPPERS Philipp (Germany)  
HAMMERSTEIN Jacob (Spain)

### Turkey-Armenia: Towards Dialogue

KOROSEC Tina (Slovenia)  
BONCUK Neslihan (Turkey)  
YOĞUN Mirhan (Turkey)  
KAYA Pelin Pınar (Turkey)  
FOLKERS Udo (Germany)  
KILLIAN Petra (Germany)  
GRZELCZYK Mateusz (Poland)  
BABALIK Filiz (Turkey)  
IMARISIO Carlo Giuseppe (Italy)

### Intercultural Dialogue

CHRISTMANN Juliet (France)  
HELLGREN Tess (U.S.A.)  
TEPELİ Hasret (Turkey)  
YILDIRIM Mustafa (Turkey)  
MADAKBAŞ Elif (Turkey)  
WETZEL Isabel (Germany)  
KILINÇ Nilay (Turkey)  
KLEIN Mélanie (Germany)

### Minority Rights in Turkey

YURDAKUL Elif Cansu (Turkey)  
CARAMIDARU Alexandra (Romania)  
KOCI Kristyna (Czech Republic)  
GRYGO Blazej (Poland)  
ENASOAIE Irina (Romania)  
YILDIRIM Mustafa (Turkey)  
KICAITE Edita (Luxembourg)  
CİRİTCİ Selahattin (Turkey)  
TURGUT Arzu (Turkey)

### Istanbul Capital of Culture

URBONAITE Milda (Lithuania)  
ERKARA Mehmet Anıl (Turkey)  
ILCAN Nazife (Turkey)  
ÖZGÜR Refika (Turkey)  
ÖZSOYLU Fulden (Turkey)  
LEY Julia (Germany)



Each group worked together on the proposal topics and, at the end of the session, they had to make an oral presentation of their own “exploration”. Some of the groups gave us a written version of their presentation.

**MINORITY RIGHTS IN TURKEY 2009**

**National and ethnic minorities within Turkey**

History background

Dealing with the question of Minority Rights in Turkey is a vast and current issue in the term of Turkey's accession process toward the European Union. The crucial matter is the Lausanne Treaty which has been signed by shortly operated the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismet İnönü. The new peace treaty from 1923 recognized only non-Moslem minorities within Turkey. However, still millions of people who describe themselves as Muslim but also as Kurds, Laz, Carcasians become unrecognizable in the political and legal term. When the Turkish Modern Nationalism concept raised inside the Anatolian state boundaries and Atatürks motto: "Happy is he who says 'I am a Turk'" has been spread throughout all country, the violent Nationalists action of Ethnic Group become the only respond. During years 1923-1945 many revolts took place in South-Eastern Anatolia. The estimated number of death tool venues can be counted in thousands of remains. For instance, every single Kurdish national uprising in the XX Century appeared to become a failure.

The 1915 Armenian question has been a huge turmoil after World War I for state society as well as scholars. Till the year 1971 most of non-Moslem minorities have had the right to education in national language, it has changed at the end of XX Century. However, the situation of minorities, which has been legally recognized in 1923, did not changed a lot during second half of previous century. Still the education in the minorities' mother language seems to be imbroglio.

The breakthrough of 1980s and 1990s has brought a new dimension in Kurdish-Turkish relations. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, established in 1978, were using weapons as argument for Kurdish independency as the guerilla war has been started in 1984 and lasted with two cease-fires till 2007. Nowadays Kurdish society is trying to deal with deficit of minority right in Minor Asia with the help of DTP (Democratic Society Party) Parliamentary Members and few legally based organization operating in Turkish Republic like: KÜRT-KAV, PSK, and MKM.

**TURKEY 2008 PROGRESS REPORT ON MINORITY RIGHTS -EU-**

We all agree that reforms and progress, even they are gradually developed or faced some problems, should be in favor of a more democratic and modern Turkey. In other words, all these reforms and amendments should contribute to the progress of Turkey. Minority rights has become allways a debatable issue throughout the history of both Otoman and new Republican Turkey. Below, you will find some crucial parts of Turkey Progress Report of the EU on minority rights starting from 1 October 2007 until early October 2008.

- First of all, Turkey's approach to minority rights did not change. According to the Turkish authorities, Jews, Armenians and Greeks are minorities. (only non Muslim communities-the 1923 Lausanne Treaty).
- the Turkish authorities consider Turkish citizens as individuals with equal rights before the law, rather than as individuals belonging to the majority or to a minority.

•The EU s view is that

- Despite this understanding, Turkey should grant specific rights to certain Turkish citizens (in accordance with European standards) on the grounds of their ethnic origin, religion or language (to preserve their identity)

Report says that;

- Management of minority schools needs regulation. Discriminatory language is gradually removing from textbooks .
- Children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn it in the Turkish public schooling system.
- As regards the Alevis, government announced an initiative at improving dialogue with this community and addressing its concerns
- A municipal council recognized a Cem house as a place of worship and applied mosque tariffs to its water charges.
- However the government's initiatives did not continue.
- Non Muslim communities still face problems due to lack of legal personality.

- The Ecumenical patriarch is not free to use the ecclesiastical title Ecumenical on all occasions
- In January 2008 Prime Minister Erdogan declared that use of the title ecumenical should not be a matter on which the state should rule.
- The Greek minority continues to encounter problems with education and property rights.
- channel broadcasting in languages other than Turkish has encountered some difficulties.
- The police and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) apply a policy of strict monitoring of broadcasts in Kurdish.
- There has been no progress in the situation of the *Roma*, who frequently face discriminatory treatment in access to adequate housing, education, social protection, health and employment.
- Turkey made some limited progress on *cultural rights*, but there are still some restrictions, particularly on the use of languages other than Turkish( in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public services.)

Minority rights had always been a issue for Turkey. The existing government, AKP since 2002, tries to solve the problems of the internal politics. However there are still remaining issues. Also some of the problems came after the policies of the new government. The headscarf issue can be mainly mentioned. This issue had took a lot of importance on the headlines which is about giving the right to use the headscarf in the public institutions. The AKP was initially optimistic about broadening the usage of the headscarf would also addressed under “European umbrella” however in 2004 the ECHR ruled that banning students from universities did not constitute a limit on religious freedom... Turkey abided the most of the rules of the European Court of Human Rights in the majority of the cases but most of them are still waiting. After the Copenhagen Criteria there had been no developments as regards “ratification of human rights instruments”. The Optional Protocol of the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) signed in September 2005, has not been ratified. The ratification of the UN Convention against the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities is still pending. Also there had been some attacks against the minorities and the diversity in the culture. The murder of the Father Santoro in Trabzon in 2006, assassinations of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 and the killing of the three Protestants in Malatya in 2007 who were publishing the Bible. These issues were broadened the pattern of the harassments. Also the laws which should solve the issues caused much more trouble than solving them, like Article 301.

The progress report of 2008 of the EU came the conclusion that there was negligence error and lack of coordination in the activities on security organizaitors and gendarmerie to prevent murder. Also there is need for greater public awareness of the work of these institutions. On the other hand during the process of candidacy, in 2004 the first private course in Kurdish language opened and the Kurdish broadcasting had started and the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement about the Dink murder as “the bullet has been fired to the democracy and the freedom of expression.” shows the attitude of the Turkish Republic to the harassments of the rights of the minorities.

## Conclusion

### To sum up

Turkey is a land of many ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. It is home not only to Turks, but also Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, Ezidis, Assyrians, Laz, Caferis, Roma...It is mix of languages, cultures and traditions.

Modern Turkey founded by Mustafa Kemal is as secular state without a state religion, or separate ethnic divisions/ identities.

The only concept of "minorities" which has been accepted by the Republic of Turkey, is in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1924 and which is still strictly limited to Greeks, Jews and Armenians, so non muslims. This concept as you saw in our presentation consist only in religious matters and totally exclude the concept of the ethnic minorities (Kurds,Christian Assyrians, Alevis and all the others.)

After 1999, when Turkey was recognized as an official candidate for EU membership, Turkey started huge political reform process, which markedly accelerated after 2002, when AKP came to power. Significant progress has been made toward garanting limted and conditional language rights to ethnic and linguistic minorities and remendingy some of the property rights to non-Muslims. Not only report from European Commission but also many others reports from sources such as Human Rights Watch, European Parliament, Amnesty International, national parliaments in EU member states etc. are talking about this declining discrimination. However much have to be done. Turkey is at a turning point. The new constitution, preparing by AKP, may be the most significant change. But question is when it will be ready? And will it go forward to real equality?

**EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF CULTURE and IT'S HISTORY**  
**ISTANBUL – EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF CULTURE 2010**



It is said that the **concept for a "European city of culture" came to life** in a chat between the former Greek and French Ministries for culture, namely Mrs Mercouri and Mr Lang, while they were waiting together for a flight at Athens airport by January 1985. The European City of Culture project was launched, following Melina Mercouri's initiative, by the Resolution of Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs meeting on 13 June 1985, in order to contribute to bringing the people of Europe together. This event is different from other cultural events by its size and its visibility. It requires a high standard of artistic quality. Since 1985, more than 30 cities have been designated European Capitals of Culture, from Stockholm to Genoa, Athens to Glasgow, and Cracow to Porto. Over the years, this event has evolved without losing sight of its primary objective: to highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures and the features they share, promote greater mutual acquaintance between European citizens, foster a feeling of European citizenship.

The title is awarded to a city for a chosen year. Cities applying for the title have the option of associating a regional territory – or even euro-regional in the case of border cities – with their programme. For example, Luxembourg associated the Great Region with its programme for 2007, and Essen has included the Ruhr region for 2010. Nevertheless, only the city which makes the proposal can bear the title.

A city is not designated Capital of Culture solely for what it is or what it does. It is awarded the title principally on the strength of the programme of specific cultural events which it proposes organising in the year in question, which is meant to be an exceptional year. The city is asked to draw on its special features and demonstrate creativity. It follows that, although the city's heritage and long-standing cultural life may stand it in good stead, they may form only a basis for the organisation of the event. The event offers an opportunity to strengthen cooperation in the field of culture and promote lasting dialogue at European level. It must underline the common features and the diversity of European cultures. This diversity also refers to the cultural input from all the resident populations of migrants or new arrivals from European countries and beyond.

One of the key objectives of the event is to foster the knowledge which European citizens may have of one another and at the same time to create a feeling of belonging to the same community. In this respect, the overall vision of the event must be European, and the programme must have an appeal at European level.

In 2010 Istanbul will share the title of European capital together with two more cities – Essen in Germany and Pecs in Hungary.

**Main tourist places** should be mentioned.

*Galata bridge* was constructed in 1845 by Valide Sultan, the mother of Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid I (1823-1861). Admiral Hasan Ahmet Paşa renovated the bridge, putting it back into service in 1863 since it had been damaged in short span of time. At the end of 19th century, Aziziye Karakolu (Police Station) adorned it with eclectic accents built in the fore part of the bridge in the Galata district in order to increase pedestrian traffic and to quell the emerging (rising) discontent of the public.

After 37 years of service, a heavy bridge rolling with waterpower was constructed on the site. It was opened on the third anniversary of Sultan Mehmet V's ascension to the throne in 1912

The first time electric cars crossed this bridge between Eminönü and Karaköy was in January of 1914. The construction of a new bridge in the Golden Horn began in 1987. The Historical Galata Bridge was burnt for an unknown reason and a large fire damaged half of the bridge before the construction of the new bridge was completed in May 1992. After the fire, construction of the new bridge was accelerated, and it was opened on the site of the old bridge in June 1992.

The pieces of the old bridge, which was composed of 11 plaques, were left on the site in the Karaköy district, and the undamaged parts of the structure were carried away and placed on the foot in the Arttürk Bridge located in the Unkapanı district.

The Galata Bridge was being adequately protected against fire. Therefore, smoking was prohibited so as not to be burn the wooden platform of the bridge during day time. Moreover, the bridge has since been closed. It was known that the bridge was servicing pedestrians and carriages for hire, so a customary charge was initiated (müruriye).

The Galata Bridge is not only an architectural beauty, but it is also leaves a poetic image the life of the people of Istanbul.

The *Topkapi Palace*, also known as Saray-i Cedid-I Amire with its previous name, received its name as Topkapi from one of the gates in the city walls in 19th century. Construction of Topkapi Palace started twenty years after the Conquest of Istanbul. Although its construction was complete in 1479, structuring of the Palace continued dynamically and several additions made to it. Having 700 thousand square meter land space, it expands from Ayasofya to Gulhane, from Gulhane to Sirkeci and is surrounded with high and wide wall, called sur-i sultani. Walls of the Palace are stretched from Sepetciler Kasri [Mansion] to Ahir Kapisi [Stable House Gate]. There are 28 towers over these walls. Part of the walls facing the seashore was demolished because of the passage of railway in 1888; seaside mansions also got their share from this demolition.

It is so estimated that Topkapi Palace had around 13 gates. Most of these gate have vanished. The majestic Bab-i Humayun Gate of Topkapi Palace is located on the direction of Ayasofya's facing of the sea and across the Sultanahmet Fountain. This gate is the main entrance of the Palace. It was first built during the period of Sultan Fatih and has gone through several restorations. Witnessed to many historical events throughout the Ottoman History, the gate still preserves its magnificence. This gate was used to open with Sabah Ezani [Subuh / Morning Prayer Call] and to close with Yatsi Ezani [Ishaa / Late Evening Prayer Call]. There is the Tugra [Sultan's Signature] of Sultan Mehmet II and a stele indicating the historical record of the building in 1478. Another stele was put by Sultan Abdulaziz in 1867, mentioning about its reconstruction.

There is the primary courtyard in the inner part of Bab-i Humayun. This courtyard was greatly damage in a fire broke out in 19th century. There was a "deavi kosku [mansion]" in this courtyard where citizens' letters of application were accepted. In the right hand side of the gate, there were the offices of treasury public servants, which were once used as infirmary. Moreover, there was the bake house of the Palace behind the wall on the right side of the courtyard. On the left side, however, Ara Irin Church is located. Imperial Mint is very close by and this premise is open to public as mint museum. Towards the end of the courtyard, there is a fountain called "Cellat Cesmesi / Executioner's Fountain". Across it, there is Bab-us Selam [Gate of Welcoming/Greeting] which opens into a second courtyard.

Through the exhibition halls of clocks and miniatures, fourth courtyard appears. In the fourth courtyard, Sunnet [Circumcision] Room and Hekimbasi Room are the leading structures, besides Sofa Mansion, Revan Mansion and Baghdad Mansion. Revan Mansion was built in 1634 by Sultan Murat IV, on the occasion of celebrating the seize of Erivan from Iranians. Inner part of the building is fully cover with Iznik ceramic tiles, cupboard handles were inlaid with nacre. Baghdad Mansion is another mansion built by Sultan Murat IV. It was built on 25 December 1638, on the occasion of the conquest of Baghdad and it was named after Baghdad. Sunnet Room, however, was built in 1641 by Deli Ibrahim, in which Ottoman princes were circumcised for nearly two centuries. Another work of Ibrahim is bronze baldachin in the side of the terrace, which he named as Iftariye Mansion, built in 1640.

The last premise built in Topkapi Palace was Mecidiye Mansion which has an overview of Golden Horn, Marmara and Bosphorus. The building was raised by Abdulmecit in 1840. Transformed into a museum, Topkapi Palace makes its visitors witness to the history, culture, grandeur magnificence and profusion of an Empire, which had lasted for a very long time.

Evliya Celebi writes that Sultan Yavuz Selim had a mansion built in where today *Dolmabahce Palace* is located. The location was filled with stones and the mansion was enlarged during Sultan Ahmet I. The palace and the premise was named after this instance. Sultan Mahmut II had a new palace built in the same location in 19th century. The Palace we know today was built by Sultan Abdulmecit I in 1842 through the architect Karabet Balyan. Its construction continued until 1853. The Palace was utilized for official matters, besides being residence of Sultan Abdulmecit. Sultan Abdulmecit's brother, Sultan Abdulaziz also lived in this Palace. After the declaration of the Turkish Republic, the Palace became the Presidential Residence of Ataturk in Istanbul and preserves its very significance since then, as it is the place where Ataturk passed away on 10 November 1938.

Major buildings of Dolmabahce Palace are comprised of Harem, Mabeyn, Clock Tower and Dolmabahce Mosque. There are 285 rooms, 46 saloons, 6 bathroom and 68 toilets. The Palace was built on 110 thousand square meter and was transformed to electricity and radiator [heating] system. The banister of the staircase of Mabeyn has a marvelous outlook with crystals; Throne Hall in Mabeyn has a crystal chandelier of 400 tons with 700 bulbs, hung from the dome of 36 meters, which adds some European tone to the hall. This chandelier was given as a gift by Queen Victoria. This Throne Hall hosted the inauguration of Ottoman Assembly of Sultan Abdulhamit II on 19 March 1877. Besides, there is a corridor in Harem Section to watch the Throne Hall.

It accommodates different rooms like Harem, Blue Hall for ceremonies, Pink Hall for ladies' entertainment, rooms Ataturk resided and Valide Sultan rooms. It is said that 30 meter tall clock tower in the entrance of the Palace was only completed in 1895. Dolmabahce Mosque was completed in 1853 by the architect, Nikogos Balyan of Balyans, who had marks on the Ottoman architecture. There is also a small mansion, built in 19th century, for the birds of the Sultan in the backyard of Dolmabahce Palace. The building hosted several birds of different species during that period.

Having been transformed to a museum, Dolmabahce Palace is under the authority of the National Palaces Administrative Board.

Although there is no definite information about when the Galata Tower was built, it is claimed that the Tower has been built during the reign of Emperor Iustinianos in 507 A.D.

It is also called Christea Turris (Tower of Christ) by the Genoese and Megalos Pyrgos (The Great Tower) by the Byzantines and took the present shape during the Genoese period. The Tower had a big damage with the earthquake in 1509, it was renewed by the architect Hayrettin, a famous architect of that period. It was also used as a jail for prisoners, who were sentenced to work at the Kasimpaşa Naval Dockyard, during the reign of Süleiman the Magnificent (ruling 1520–66). The head astrologer Takiyeddin Efendi has established an observatory at the top of the Tower at the end of 16th century. It was used as an observatory for a particular period of time. Later, it was closed and turned into prison again by Sultan Murat III (1546-1595).

In 1638, Hezarfen Ahmet Çelebi flew as an early aviator using artificial wings from this tower over the Bosphorus to the slopes of Üsküdar on the Anatolian side during the reign of Murad V. It was used as a building towards 17th century by the Mehter Band, janissary band of musicians. After 1717, it was used as fire-observatory tower to be equal to fire, but unfortunately the Tower itself was burnt down to the ground in 1794.

After it was repaired, cumba, a little room having a wooden framework, has been added to the tower, during the rein of Sultan Selim III (1761-1808). After another fire in 1831, Sultan Mahmur added two more floors to the Tower and the top of the tower is covered with a famous cloth of conical hat shape cloth. An inscription written by Pertev Paşa concerned with repair works is fixed onto the Tower in that time. After a strong storm in 1875, the framework of the roof with conical hat was gone and repaired again in 1960. Today, the Tower is operated solely for touristic purpose by a private company. The elevator only goes up 7th floor, last two floors on the tower are taken by walking.

*Maiden's Tower* is located 150- 200 m off-shore of Salacak district of Uskudar. Although there is no definite information about when the Maiden's Tower was built, the process of architectural structuring of the tower in some sources goes back to 341 B.C.

Names of the Maiden's Tower in old times are Damalis and Leandros. The name Damalis is the wife's name of Kharis, Athen King, in that time. When Damalis died, she was buried on this shore and the name Damalis was given to the Tower. It is also known as "arcla" that means "a little castle", during the Byzantine period.

After the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Empire, the existing tower is pulled down and the wooden tower is constructed on the site. The wooden tower was burned down to the ground in 1719. It was built of stone once again by the head architect of the city named Nevşehirli Damat İbrahim Paşa. The cone-capped part of the Tower was taken away and the kiosk fitted with glass was replaced on the site. A dome covered with lead was added to the kiosk. Rakım Efendi, a famous calligrapher, has put an inscription with the Sultan Mahmut II's signature on a marble that is placed on the door of the Tower. A lantern is added to the Tower in 1857 and the light of the tower was turned into automatic light system in 1920.

The Maiden's Tower is used for many different purposes, such as tax collecting location from merchantman, defense tower, lighthouse in the flow of the history. During the cholera epidemic in 1830, it was used as isolation hospital and radio station. After Republic Period, it was used as a light house a little while. The tower handed over to the Ministry of Defence in 1964 and Maritime Enterprises in 1982. At present, after renovated, turn into a restaurant by a private company, it was open to public as a restaurant.

Short introduction to **Istanbul's history** should also be made.

In the last decades of the Byzantine Empire, the Constantinople had decayed as the Byzantine state became increasingly isolated and financially bankrupt. On 29 May 1453, Sultan Mehmed II "the Conqueror" captured Constantinople after a 53-day siege and proclaimed that Constantinople was now the new capital of the Ottoman Empire. When the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara

Speaking **about the programe for 2010** as a European Capital of Culture, "Istanbul, a city of the four elements" would function as a bridge, connecting Europe to its East. It is a living example of the meeting of civilisations. It has been at the crossroads of European civilisations for centuries and it has learned to "live differences".

The programme of the year is built around the four elements of the universe, which have a special meaning to Istanbul: "Earth" refers to tradition and transformation ; "Air - heaven sent" will bring local and foreign musicians together. "Water - the city and the sea" will focus on a multitude of activities on the Bosphorus and "Fire - forging the future" will focus on modern arts and events for large parts of its population.

Name of Istanbul will be associated with culture and the arts all over the world. **Main benefits** for the city:

- As Turkey moves ahead with the process of its candidacy for the European Union, the projects that will be realized will demonstrate that Istanbul, the symbol of the country, has been interacting with European culture for hundreds of years.

- The city's cultural heritage will be managed in a sustainable manner and it will become even more of a magnet than ever.
- Istanbul will achieve lasting gains in the fields of urban renewal, urban living and environmental and social development.
- New museums will be established to protect and display our cultural assets and historical buildings will be renovated, given new roles and opened to the public.
- Istanbulites will embrace new artistic disciplines. Young talented people will have the opportunity to become more closely involved in artistic creativity.
- obs will be created for a large number of people ranging from communications to organization, education, design, management and creative fields.
- Those who come to Istanbul for cultural and artistic projects will visit the city's cultural riches, mosques, churches, palaces and museums.
- Cultural tourism will be invigorated and develop. (Educated, cultured tourists spend three times as much as normal tourists. This means that, as a European Capital of Culture, Istanbul will have a great tourism potential.)
- Many people from the world of culture and the arts, together with members of the print and visual media, will come to Istanbul from Europe and different countries all around the world.
- This will make a positive contribution to the promotion and branding of Istanbul.
- Being selected as a European Capital of Culture will give a boost to the city's economic relations with Europe as well as contributing to its cultural relations.
- With the renovation that will take place, the administrators and administered will join together, hand in hand, sharing their knowledge and experience, to develop a long-term sustainable model for the future.
- Through discovering the beauty of their city, Istanbulites will be proud to live in such a city.

## **Laicite and secularism**

### **Notes from oral presentation by Philip Kueppers**

It has to be noticed that laicite and secularism are different concepts. Whereas Laicite can be described as a strict separation between religious affairs and governmental affairs, a top down process, secularism is social process, limited to the 'down', the public level.

The definitions of secularism remain vague for they differ significantly. However in general secularism refers to the process of balancing those who's wishes and desires are focused on the world and those who's hopes and dreams refer to the afterworld, the epistemology of the Kantian notion of immanence versus the transcendental believe.

In regard to Turkey's laicite the intention was one of a secularization of the society, a top down process of social engineering. The goal was a transformation of the Turkish society that closely identified itself with religious institutions to a more, as it was believed in these years, modern identity with a clear separated relationship. This intention awoke out of historical necessity for Turkey and the Weberian European discourse at that time, the idea that a modernization of society will see a decrease in religion. Hence a top down secularization process could speed up the process of societal modernization. The development predicted by Weber became one of the characteristics of the "Modern Society". If this however remains true for today needs to be questioned, for we do not live in modern societies any more. Our current discourse is a post-modern discourse that is besides many other phenomena characterized by a complete deconstruction of our societal phenomena in artifacts, naked and empty entities. These naked entities have evoked a new desire among the public to reconstruct their values. These processes have given rise to a new understanding of religion in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Scholars like Scott Thomas have convincingly argued that someone or even a political entity can nowadays be modern and religious at the same time (see Thomas 2005). It seems therefore that Turkey is in need of a new discourse to limited the mutual radicalization currently taking place between those how fear the lose of the secular society (even if it has to be mentioned again that secularism is a process of balancing and hence no society can be completely secular) and those who wish to include more religious values in their daily life.

## Intercultural Dialogue

### I Introduction: The importance of intercultural dialogue in the Turkish context

In the eighty-five years since Turkey's statehood, the world has changed tremendously. Faced with an increasingly interconnected international order, Turkey has both the challenge and opportunity to capitalize on its unique physical and political position to become a major global player. The key to its successful development, both domestic and foreign, lies in fostering productive cultural exchange with tangible results. In this paper we examine the positive potential of intercultural dialogue when applied to Turkey's incredible diversity. After establishing a basic understanding of the meaning of such dialogue, we turn to its specific application in the Turkish situation, both nationally and internationally. Using the Sulukule community in Istanbul and second and third generation Turks in Germany as case studies, we examine how the cultural, social, and institutional elements of intercultural dialogue are being enacted for Turks both inside and outside Turkey. We are then able to draw conclusions about what intercultural dialogue might mean for Turkey's future as not only a singular nation but a crucial international actor

Before discussing the importance of intercultural dialogue, it is necessary to establish a foundational understanding of what this concept means. According to the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts),

*“Intercultural dialogue is a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange or interaction between individuals, groups and organisations with different cultural backgrounds or world views. Among its aims are: to develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to foster equality; and to enhance creative processes. (1)*

Using this comprehensive definition, it is possible to see intercultural dialogue as a multidirectional process that aims at encouraging peaceful coexistence and enabling stronger collaboration among diverse groups. This “cultural diversity” can come in many forms: ethnicity, religion, nationality, socioeconomic status, even political ideology. No matter what type of division, intercultural dialogue's purpose is to bridge the divide between disparate mindsets and lifestyles in order to build a more cohesive world.

This concept has particular importance within the Turkish state. Turkish diversity is significant, with deep roots in its historical legacy and geographic location. Turkey is home to a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups: While the majority of citizens are Sunni Muslim, approximately 20% of citizens identify as Kurdish; notable Armenian, Alevi, Greek Orthodox, and Roma minorities also exist. In addition to these differences, migrant populations also reside in Turkey; according to ERICarts, in 2000 nearly 2% of Turkey's population of —71 million was foreign-born. (2) Migrants come predominantly from nearby areas such as Albania and the Balkan states; some also emigrate from neighboring EU, central Asian, or middle eastern nations.(3) In addition to this type of diversity, great socioeconomic and ideological differences continue to exist within the Turkish public. Urban-rural disparity and intra-city inequalities deserve serious attention, as do current debates over the role of secularism and religion in daily life and government structures. This wide diversity has spurred serious tension, even conflict, throughout Turkey's past, from the Armenian and Kurdish incidents to military coups over secularism. As Turkey looks to the future, it is extremely necessary for this diversity to be addressed in a more direct, positive manner.

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(1) “What is ‘Intercultural Dialogue?’” ERICarts. Accessed 28 July 2009  
<http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/intercultural-dialogue.php>.

(2) “Migrants and Minorities in Europe — Basic Data and Trends.” ERICarts. Accessed 28 July 2009.  
[http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/webfiles/10/en/sharing\\_Diversity\\_Annex\\_4.pdf](http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/webfiles/10/en/sharing_Diversity_Annex_4.pdf) (p. 144).

(3) *Ibid.*

Turkey's adoption of a more active intercultural dialogue is especially important given its current orientation as an EU member nation. European Union conditionality requirements on greater minority privileges, civil liberties, democratization, and human rights in Turkey all require greater attention to be paid to active pursuit of this exchange. Dialogue between Turkey and current EU member states is similarly necessary: According to Ambassador Marc Pierini, head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, "Cultural diversity is at the very heart of the European Union endeavour. Intercultural dialogue is a must between Turkey and the European Union."<sup>(4)</sup> Given the widespread public concerns about Turkish membership, communicating the reality of Turkish culture — in all its diversity — to other European nations is a vital element in furthering Turkish accession to the EU. One way in which this can occur is through greater interaction between Turkish immigrants in EU member nations. In many countries throughout Europe, substantial populations of Turkish residents provide the most direct exposure to Turkish culture — in Germany, for example, Turks are the largest minority group, numbering around 2.5 million in 2008<sup>(5)</sup>. While many international structures (such as the Alliance of Civilizations) have been formed to facilitate this cultural exchange beyond Turkey's borders, more can and should be done to accelerate the process.

In order to more specifically examine the Turkish potential for intercultural dialogue, we have chosen two communities as lenses of analysis. Our exploration of these areas is divided into cultural, social, and institutional concerns. It is clear that these categories are neither isolated nor mutually exclusive; developments in any one area necessarily affect the others. Nor is it possible that our examination is a comprehensive explanation — our intent, rather, is to merely shed light on various elements of intercultural dialogue inside and outside Turkey in order to determine its present substance and future potential.

### III Cultural Diversity in Turkey

Turkey has been in membership talks with the European Union for a long time and promoting cultural diversity is one of the major topics being addressed. In other words, under the Copenhagen political criteria, Turkey must ensure cultural diversity and promote cultural rights of all its citizens, as set out in the Accession Partnership. Moreover, political pluralism is an integral part of any democracy. The Turkish parliament is today largely representative of the country's political diversity as well. After 1999 Helsinki Summit, the concept of "unity-in-diversity" was adopted in Turkey as referred to in Prof. Ayhan Kaya's article "Unity in Diversity": Ethnic/Cultural Diversity in Turkey and the European Union".

The key element for building intercultural dialogue in Turkey is being aware of the cultural diversity of these lands. According to the research held by Peter Andrews in 1973, there are 50 different "cultures" living in Turkey; these groups include Turks, Kurds, Georgians, Muslim Bosnians, Circassians, Lazs, Hemshins, Pomaks, Arabs, Syrians, Armenians, Jews, and Roma. This is an advantage for Turkey, if only the potential can be realized. Citizens of the Turkish Republic have to give up categorizing people according to their religion, lifestyle or language and understand that labeling people as the "other" causes conflict and bigger problems in society. This is what Attila Durak, famous photographer, underlines in his work. He photographed 44 different ethnic groups in different parts of Turkey and named his Project as "Ebru: Reflections of Cultural Diversity in Turkey", published them and also opened exhibitions in 23 different cities within Turkey and abroad. These exhibitions became very successful and helpful for everyone living in this country to realize the possibility for harmony in diversity<sup>(6)</sup>

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(4) According to 'Auswaertiges Amt' (May 2009)

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/1-Laender/Tuerkei.html#t3>

(5) *Migrants and Minorities in Europe — Basic Data and Trends.* ERICarts. Accessed 28 July 2009.

[http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/files/JIO/en/Sharing\\_Diversity\\_Annex\\_4.pdf](http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/files/JIO/en/Sharing_Diversity_Annex_4.pdf) (p. 142).

(6) See Works Cited

### III The distorted dialogue of Turkish authorities with Roma inhabitants of Sulukule

Chazal, a French journalist who made a project on Sulukule in 2008, sees the district as “the place of broken hopes and dreams”. This old settlement which has been occupied by Romani communities since Byzantine times has been facing socio-cultural and economical problems since 1990 because of governmental regulations on the area. Today, Sulukule is not just known for its Romani musicians and dancers but also for the problems its inhabitants have to face.

Even though the district has been dominated by Romani people for hundreds of years, migrants from the various rural areas of Turkey also live there. On one hand, the main problems that occur in Sulukule are poverty, unemployment, poor education and lack of basic needs such as health care, security, as illustrated in the later mentioned interviews. On the other hand, Sulukule as an alienated, excluded and segregated area is also struggling with its own culture and identity. Since 2005, Sulukule has also been exposed to the problem of gentrification when Istanbul Municipality decided to restore and upgrade the poor neighbourhood. The authorities had promised to build a new and modern living area for 3500 Romani inhabitants so that they would be able to rent these houses with the money they commanded (Article 5366).

The urban renovation project, effective since November 2007, foresees the transfer of Sulukule's Roma population to social housing at the Tasoluk district located 40 kilometres away from their current residence. Though local Roma theoretically have the prerogative to buy apartments from the new to-be-built condominium complex on the side of their quarters in Sulukule, the majority of them cannot afford the prices of the new housing which means that they will either be forced out of Sulukule or will be burdened with debts they will never be able to pay back.

The main argument about the project centered on whether it was in any sense beneficial for the inhabitants. The conflict with the municipality was not only about the threat of abuse but the fact that the project could change the social organisation and structure of the neighbourhood. It would introduce several things that are not related to the lifestyle of those people. Furthermore, the project's undertaking of nice, modern apartments failed to address the question of how Sulukule residents would pay for such amenities as furniture, electricity, and water. The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced in his speech about Sulukule in March 2008:

*“... For example, there is the Sulukule Project. There is an odd talk about it going on. Those who talk thus have never been to Sulukule once in their lives. If they had gone there, they wouldn't have talked this way. Now, look at the Sulukule Project which is being implemented. On seeing this Project, (if you are sensible, sincere, what you would say I g 'Congratulations comrade. Here, you have been accomplishing good work. You are saving Sulukule from its freak condition and turning it into a modern, contemporary place furnished with historical streets at the same time. Thank you for this This is the step taken. We love Istanbul...”*

In addition, the new style of living would transform their lives within the borders of a more formalised framework. The leaders of the project would become the directors of the Romani's lives as well. Being controlled does not only contradict “the Romani way of life” but also motivates them to move out from their familiar surroundings. In this context, intercultural dialogue is key. The problems of areas like Sulukule can only be solved by taking the “social reality” of the place into account and producing solutions in the concept and context of the particular case. Perhaps intercultural dialogue will be the only way to build a bridge between the diverse ways of life, not only in Turkey, but among Turkish originated people around the world (7)

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(7) For further information about the Sulukule Project, see attachment

#### IV German Turks — From Immigrants to Fellow Citizens

The second and third generation of German Turks (Almancilar) find their challenging social and economic situation is attributed to the “Gastarbeiter-Kultur” (Hoffmann, p. 120) — culture of guest workers — from Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s which was initiated by the German government in order to overcome labour force shortages. Originally intended to serve as a temporary solution, the request for residence made migrants of Turkish origin Germany’s largest ethnic minority (8) and made Islam its second largest religious affiliation after Christianity. In order to deal with this changing social reality, Germany took necessary steps to facilitate new social settlements.

By regulating the Foreigners Law in 1991, which was redrafted as the new Immigration Law in 2005, people of Turkish origin got rid of their migrant status and were first seen as a part of German society as well as German citizenship gained an impetus among Turks. The number and variability of German Turkish non-governmental organizations increased in political and economic spheres. Since 2000, German law has banned dual citizenship which led to a critical discourse among German Turks. The new government (to be elected in September 2009) might attempt a re-establishment of dual citizenship as well as a reconsideration of the former Foreigners Law. This now necessitates immigrants to have basic knowledge of German and a proof of their income. Once migrants live in Germany, they are required to attend “adaptation courses” and fulfil their language education within two years in order not to lose benefits of the German welfare system and not to fear deportation. Even though this law was adjusted to complicate forced and fictitious marriages, it sometimes lacks realistic implementation (9).

According to DITIP, the German equivalent of the Turkish ‘Diyanet tleri Bakanligi’ (10), 880 Muslim communities are settled in Germany out of which 16 are located in the former working districts of Kreuzberg (“Little Istanbul”), Neukölln and Wedding” (11) With 56 mosques and praying facilities, the Turkish-Muslim population became a visible part of German civil culture, (12) confronting the West-orientated mainstream by defining its identity within a religious framework (13). This struggle with the feeling of alienation in German as well as in Turkish culture results in cultural disintegration. (14) However, German and Turkish institutions are working to enhance equitable cohabitation through cultural, social and political means (Weber, 2008).

As a contribution to the historical importance of German-Turkish relations and the harmonisation of both cultures, the Ernst Reuter Initiative for Intercultural Dialogue (15) was launched by Abdullah Gul and Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2006. Engaging in educational, artistic and academic exchange, this initiative tries to emphasize the importance and benefits of cultural interaction on various levels.

One of these levels is the broad field of art, emerging from cultural activities and influences of Turkish migrants in Germany. New styles and directions have appeared in almost all streams of arts and forms of culture, hybridizing the German cultural landscape and stamping it through emerging German Turkish artists with a new “global mélange” (Mayer&Terkessidis, 1998). Fatih Akin was one of the second generation Turks who grew up in Germany. His career as a film director from 1998 on was rewarded in 2008 (16) and deserved credit for integration and identity building in Europe.

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(8) See introduction

(9) Country Profiles’ by Veysel Özcan. Migration Information Source. Accessed 29 July 2009  
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.efm?ID=235>

(10) Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs

(11) <http://www.ditib.de/default.php?id=12&lang=de&filter=alphabet&abc=B>

(12) <http://www.dmk-berlin.de/toplinks/moseheen.htm>

(13) Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien (2006): 12 Maßnahmen zur Förderung des Zusammenlebens mit dem Islam in Deutschland. Essen.

(14) Spiegelestudie, Januar 2009 <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,603294,00.html>

(15) Ernst Reuter was a German refugee who escaped the Nazi regime and settled in Turkey. Before returning to Germany and becoming the first Mayor of Berlin, he lived and worked in Istanbul and Ankara. ‘Ernst Reuter Initiative for German-Turkish Dialogue’ Accessed July 29 2009.

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/ERI/ErnstReuterInitiative.html>

(16) Karlsmedaille for European media

His movie *The Edge of Heaven* (2007) (17) advocates the dialogue between German and Turkish culture. It does not point to the pessimism of integration but rather emphasizes how Germany shall change towards acculturation — leaving out ethnic and national differences. In order to make this dialogue possible, the film shows that knowledge and education are essential for the “peaceful” cohabitation of these cultures. Thus *The Edge of Heaven* also represents the search for identity and origin in times of globalization. According to Fatih Akin, it challenges the sense of belonging. The message is a very sober one: you are indeed able to shape or construct it. Fatih Akin develops a peculiarly unagitated meditation of the notions of home and foreignness.

Fatih Akin is a German with a second home in Turkey, as he identifies himself. This has been critically viewed by a *Spiegel* author: Home is — as the “radically globalized cinema of Fatih Akin” shows — a pragmatic, constructed concern, a window through which one can comfortably look into the great, wide world (BuB, 2007). It is an example for the ongoing debate on German-Turkish identity and the difficulties these German Turks face from the prejudiced perceptions of the German majority.

## **VI Conclusion: Making the dialogue possible**

Having examined these internal and external Turkish communities, it is possible to identify both the problems and potential that exist for intercultural dialogue. For the residents of *Sulukule*, as well as for German Turks, the major challenges to societal integration lie in limitations to representation, visibility, and socioeconomic opportunity. Our research shows that these difficulties emerge largely from a lack of communication and understanding between different communities. In order for the extensive benefits of diversity to be fully experienced by all parties, it is necessary to build policies and institutions that facilitate an open and realistic dialogue, allowing underrepresented populations to speak for themselves and listening to their articulations of identity and community needs. While initiatives like the EU’s 2008 Year of Intercultural Dialogue and the UN-affiliated Alliance of Civilizations are positive developments, change must also be actively pursued on a local, grassroots level. Organizations that encourage intercultural dialogue should be studied and replicated in order to bring diverse populations together to share their stories and recognize their common humanity. No longer is mere multicultural tolerance enough; active intercultural dialogue must be pursued to sufficiently recognize the complex relationships and interactions of diverse groups in the Turkish context. By improving accessibility to education, public services, and economic opportunities, local institutions may be the best hope for successful integration that is both productive and sensitive to social realities. Given Turkey’s modern diversity and unique international position, this intercultural dialogue has never been so important — its success will determine Turkey’s fate as both a unified nation and a global actor.

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## ANNEXE IV : SIMULATION



During two days, a team coming from IEP Berlin organised for the students a simulation to permit to the students to have a specific role in a specific situation. The topic of the simulation was *“The financial crisis and beyond : debating the EU’s financial contribution to economic recovery – investing in energy infrastructure for a low carbone future ?”*

A few days ago, the students were informed about the scenario and had to choose their specific role in the framework.

### SCENARIO

Spring time in Brussels... We are in March 2009! After a special conference in November 2008 – dealing with the effects of the global financial crisis on the European Union and its member states, the European Commission worked on the elaboration of the European Recovery Plan.

Elements of the Commission’s proposal from January 2009 for the

**REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL**  
establishing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting  
Community financial assistance to projects in the field of energy

will be discussed by the European Council, thus by YOU – being delegates of EU institutions or representatives of the member states in the European Council. Delegates of Turkey, some interest groups and members of the press will be present as well and lobby for their interests, too.

### **Negotiations about the EU Economic Recovery Plan Constitution of the delegations and repartition of the roles.**

### DELEGATIONS

#### INSTITUTION OR COUNTRY

#### PARTICIPANTS



#### **The Chair Presidency : CZECH REPUBLIC**

Head of Government : Mirek TOPOLANEK  
Foreign Minister : Karel SCHWARZENBERG

CHRISTMAN Juliet  
YOGUN Mirhan



#### **The General Secretariat of the council**

Secretary General : Javier SOLANA

TEPELI Hasret



#### **European Commission**

President : José Manuel BARROSO  
Commissioner for Energy Andris PIEBALGS

CANTEKIN Kayahan  
KUEPPERS Philip



#### **European Parliament**

Président : Hans-Gert PÖTTERING  
Rapporteur (industry), Research and Energy  
Committee) : Eugenijus MALDEIKIS

HAMMERSTEIN Jacob  
KILING Nilay  
KOTSOBAN Marina

#### **PRESS delegation**

TURGUT Azru  
KICAITE Edita  
GÜLEN Berkay  
ÖZBUR Refika

## Bulgaria



Head of Government : Sergei STANISCHEW IOANNOU Vasileios  
Foreign Minister : Iwajlo KALFIN ÖZSOYLU Fulden

## France



Head of State : Nicolas SARKOZY GREZELCZYK Matheus  
Foreign Minister : Bernard KOUCHNER CIRITCI Selahattin

## Germany



Head of Government : Angela MERKEL MADAKBAS Elif  
Foreign Minister : Frank-Walter STEINMEIER KILLIAN Petre

## Hungary



Head of Government : Gordon BAJNAI IMARISIO Carlo Giuseppe  
Foreign Minister : Peter BALAZS CARAMIDARU Alexandra

## Italy



Head of Government : Silvio BERLUSCONI YILMAZ Ferhat  
Foreign Minister : Franco FRATTINI LEY Julia

## Poland



Head of Government : Donald TUSK WETZEL Isabel  
Foreign Minister : Radoslaw SIKORSKI KLEIN Melanie

## Slovakia



Head of Government : Robert FICO KOCI Kristyna  
Foreign Minister : Jan KUBIS ILCAN Nazife

## Sweden



Head of Government : Fredrik REINFELDT COREKOGLU Barbaros  
Foreign Minister : Carl BILD T KOROZEC Tina

## The Netherlands



Head of Government : Jan Peter BALKENEND FOLKERS Udo  
Foreign Minister : Maxime VENHAGEN LÜTZIG Fabian

## Turkey



Head of Government : Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN BONCIJK Neslihan  
Foreign Minister : Ali BABACAN ENASOAIIE Irina

## United Kingdom



Head of Government : Gordon BROWN YILDIRIM Mustafa  
Foreign Minister : David MILIBAND KAYA Pelin Pinar

### Environmental NGO's



Greenpeace EU renewable policy campaigner : BABALIK Filiz  
Mrs Frauke THIES HELLGREN Tess

### Offshore wind energy stakeholder



EWEA Chief Executive : Christian KJAER ERKARA Mehmet Amil  
URBONAITE Milda



Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH presents  
**BUCCO** International GmbH  
Managing Director : Reinhard MITSCHKEK GRYGO Blazej  
YURDAKUL Elif Cansu



**CCS stakeholder (Carbon Capture and Storage Association)**  
Chairman : Gardiner HILL BOUZEMBRAK Linda  
CAMLILAR Etem Emre

At the end of the simulation, each delegation had to present the position of the country.

**Some of the positions presented on a written paper**

**POSITION OF ITALY**

*“EU to diversify its energy sources”*

**A: INTERCONNECTORS**

**1. Souther Gas Corridor**

*Nabucco*

*Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania*

Italian delegation believes that diversifying energy resources and reducing energy dependency over Russia should be one of the vital priorities of EU. In that sense Italy supports the Nabucco project that will supply new energy resources to 5 member states.

However, Italy still believes that being dependant on Iranian gas will not be concrete solution of diversifying energy resources of Europe, regarding the unstable political situation in Iran and gas production capacity of the country in the next 30 years. Keeping in mind that other gas suppliers Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will only supply a 18 bcm of natural gas per annum, Europe should rather listen Merkel and Medvedev in terms of credibility of that project. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently confirmed her country's opposition (3 March 2009) to funding the flagship Nabucco gas pipeline project with European money, stressing that the problem is not financing but finding gas to feed the pipeline; and Russian President Medvedev had an similar approach to that project stating “If one wants to make some holes on earth and build some metal lines, Russia has nothing to say for that”.

In that sense Italy has doubts on Nabucco project but still supports it remembering that Central European states were the most affected ones in the energy crisis in 2006 and believes there should be a EU support to that area to diversify their energy sources.

As stated by Merkel, Nabucco project itself does not need a further support from European Communities funding, as soon as it has been already financed and still can be financed by private sectors and the initiator of the project Turkey.

Therefore Italy, asks for a €100m of cut from the total €250m on Nabucco project and use that €100 on other energy sources.

**2. Central and South East Europe**

Infrastructure and equipment to permit west-east gas flow in the event of short term supply disruption All member states €20 million

Italian delegation believes that in case of a short term supply disruption, there are some countries in more need of energy than other countries and allocation of this funding should only include those countries which would be extremely affected in short-term crises.

Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia

**3. Mediterranean**

Italian delegation feels the necessity to declare that there is an unfair allocation of budget applied to Mediterranean states.

Apparently, on going projects interconnecting African energy to Europe has been disregarded. And Malta, obviously a Mediterranean state has been also excluded from the budget plan, who is in a need of a €30m of funding to finance the Electricity interconnection Malta-Italy.

## OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS

Italian delegation believes that the diversification of energy sources and in particular the expansion of domestic sources of renewable energies are essential in order to ensure energy security throughout the coming years. Thus, in order to facilitate access to these new energy sources for all member states and to ensure equal chances for all countries to achieve their individual climate goals projects will have to be spread out among all member states, and should not be restricted to those countries that already possess more diversified energy supplies.

Italy has been able to achieve strong growth in sectors such as onshore wind energy, making it the world's 6th largest producer of wind energy in 2008. While this impressive achievement clearly demonstrates Italy's genuine commitment to invest in renewable energies, none of its three very promising planned offshore wind farm projects have received any financial support within the framework of the European recovery programme, whilst other countries — such as Poland — who not only have less potential for profitable offshore energy production but also applied with far smaller offshore energy projects are to receive funds. It is for this reason that Italy supports a reconsideration of the budget to provide funds to more than the envisaged 7 countries, which are all located within the central and Northern European countries. We believe that if Europe wants to remain competitive within the international market it will need to extend its support for projects to all corners of the continent.

Italy would really appreciate a EU support for his "Off Brindisi Offshore wind project" and a more fair distribution of the budget for each state who is working on the same projects.

## C. CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE PROJECTS

Recently, there are 8 EU member states working on Carbon Capture and Storage Projects. This recovery plan is envisaged support to 6 states and not surprisingly Italy is the one of 2 countries which has been excluded from the recovery plan with Czech Republic.

Italy would again appreciate a more fair distribution of the budget between member states.

## D. HI-SPEED INTERNET CONNECTION

Firstly, we would like to clear out one fact that, if a rural area does not have broadband high speed Internet connection, it does not mean, that area has no internet connection.

Difference between dial-up internet connection and Broadband Hi-Speed Internet Connection

Dial-Up modem 56 kb/ps via telephone line

Broadband (ADSL-VDSL) 256 kb/ps to 24 mb/ps

- Commission proposed to invest 1 billion Euro 'to extend and upgrade high-speed internet in rural communities'. Whilst the Italian delegation recognizes the importance of broadly available internet access for the development and integration of the European market, it believes that the amount allocated to improve internet access (1 bn €) is substantially too high.
- The recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine has shown yet another time just how detrimental Europe's dependence on outside energy suppliers can be to its internal economic wellbeing. We believe that this makes the diversification and broadening of its energy sources one of the top priorities of the EERP, which is not reflected in the distributive allocation of funds. We therefore suggest that the amount allocated for broadening internet access be reduced by 200 m and that this money could instead be used for energy and electricity interconnection projects.
- This is further recommendable, as we believe that an improvement of electricity and energy interconnections would be of great benefit to all member states alike, whereas broadband internet access would only entail benefits for a very small number of member states.

Regarding all those facts, Italian delegation asks EU states about their priorities: Do we want to see faster internet connection to download some big material from internet in a shorter time, or do we really need to focus on our energy dependency and climate change and use that 1 billion on more efficient areas?

## **POSITION OF KINGDOM OF SWEDEN**

### **1. Proposal by the European Commission regarding the EU's financial contribution to economic recovery**

- a. Aim of the Commission: to stimulate the projects in the field of energy efficiency, clean technologies and infrastructure, to improve the broadband internet connection coverage (especially in rural parts) and to contribute to long-term competitiveness of EU based on a greener technology.
- b. As one of Sweden's priorities is to create conditions for an efficient and sustainable energy use and a cost-effective energy supply, Sweden will strive to increase the amount of funds allocated for the projects in the field of offshore wind energy. Our country could benefit from funds allocated to this prospective area of development significantly, if the funds are distributed wisely. With sufficient means, Sweden will be able to take the holistic approach to encouraging the rapid expansion of wind power.

### **2. Negotiating objectives for European Council meeting in spring 2009:**

- a. Preferred outcome: (I) Significant increase of appropriations in the heading of offshore wind energy projects. Sweden reiterates the importance of wind power as a renewable component energy supply. Usage of wind power is to play an important part in transforming the Swedish energy system into an ecological and economically sustainable system. Sweden has the basic conditions needed to make more use of wind energy. (II) Significant decrease of funds allocated to finance internet broadband connection projects, as our delegation believes these projects should be funded and organized exclusively by national governments of member states. (III) Kingdom of Sweden expresses its support for research and development related to CCS. Therefore, Sweden welcomes the initiative of Commission to increase the appropriations in this promising area, having in mind that we have to be more efficient in our use of energy.
- b. What do you have to achieve? Increase in support for offshore wind projects.
- c. What might be negotiable? We are open for propositions, redistribution of funds within the field of electricity and as interconnections.

### **3. What positions are already ?**

- a. Germany, Netherlands, UK share similar position with Sweden regarding the demand for increased funds for wind energy projects. At the same time, mentioned countries would like to see decrease of appropriations distributed to the internet broadband projects.
- b. We would appreciate more information about other countries' positions regarding CCS and gas and electricity interconnection projects.
- c. Sweden believes that all delegations share a significant voice in the Council and every delegation will have a possibility to influence the negotiations outcome, however the most significant influence we expect from the delegations of Germany and United Kingdom.
- d. The largest differences regarding our negotiation positions will presumably appear between net contributor countries on the one hand, and net recipients countries on the other hand.

#### **4. Stance to take at the conference?**

- a. When explaining our basic positions, we will emphasise our priorities mentioned above.
- b. Our delegation will adapt our tactics with regard to the stance and actions of other delegations during the negotiating process.
- c. Our delegation is looking forward to collaborate with all delegations, paying special attention to the delegations of UK, Germany and Netherlands (depending on the discussed topic).
- d. Our delegation believes it is necessary to look for information, to research other countries' positions, to find where agreement is possible etc. Therefore we will strive to be as active in involving ourselves in the communication and cooperation with other delegations as possible.
- e. We have already scheduled some informal meetings with the delegations of UK, Germany and Netherlands.

#### **5. Other activities to be considered?**

- a. We would be delighted to consult the issues with the Presidency of the European Council, as well as with the representatives of European Commission and representatives of various interest groups.
- b. Our main tactic is to build strong coalitions within each discussed area.
- e. About giving the statements for press, we shall decide within our delegation during the meeting

### **POSITION OF UNITED KINGDOM**

United Kingdom fully supports the basic ideas of the Commission's Recovery Plan. It considers this an appropriate and wide-ranging framework that includes specific proposals to guide Member States and the Community in making coordinated responses to the crisis that deal both with the immediate impact on the real economy and promote potential growth in the long-term.

UK will work with like-minded Member States to ensure that the Commission explores all other possibilities for meeting the additional resources from the existing Financial Framework (including appropriate redeployment, re-profiling of expenditure, and the use of existing margins).

Government supports using the major part of any Community recovery plan to pursue energy and climate change objectives, and that it also supports the focus on energy infrastructure, offshore wind and carbon capture and storage as contributing to improving energy security and transforming the Community into a competitive low carbon economy.

The Government supports the Commission's proposal to fund projects to improve broadband access in rural areas. However, the allocation between Member States would be based on historic allocations under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), therefore the UK's share would be very small and, consequently, not enough to make a considerable impact.

- UK support CCS.
- UK support offshore wind energy.
- UK would prefer to spread spending over a longer period of time (beyond 2010) because of the CSS projects.
- UK does not want to transfer funds aimed at rural development.

## POSITION PAPER OF TURKEY

As Turkey is one of the countries that take an effective part in the Nabucco Project, our position is majorly focused on the energy dimension of the Commission's Economic Recovery Plan. Basically, we are in favor of investing in Trans European Energy Networks and we specialize on natural gas investments.

The Nabucco pipeline project which aims to bring the natural gas from Middle East to Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary represents an important factor in Turkey's national development and its relations with the EU. Nabucco project is expected to bring important benefits for Turkey in many different areas. The achievement of this project will decrease the dependency of Turkey to Russia in terms of natural gas and prevent any negative impacts of a possible gas crisis like the one occurred at the very beginning of 2009. It may also open a new session in the relations of Turkey with the EU. Turkey evaluates this project as a crucial tool which can be used in its relations with the EU in the negotiations for opening the energy chapter. Thus, it remains as an important issue for Turkey in order to increase its bargaining power with the EU. In addition to these external advantages, Nabucco project will also bring a national benefit to Turkey in terms of job opportunities. This project is the largest foreign investment that is hosted by Turkey at one time and it will create new jobs for 5000 people in Turkey. It is expected that the job opportunities provided by Nabucco will reach 15000 people before the end of it. In that regard, it represents a crucial factor that will have a major contribution to the national economic development of Turkey.

Turkey plays a major role in this project by hosting the 65% of the whole pipeline with 2000 km. As being one of the most important participants, Turkey supports the proposal of the Commission in investing the energy for 3.5 billion Euros with a great proportion of 1750 million Euros to gas and electricity. This investment will give a new security dimension to Europe by making it independent from Russia and provide serious advantages for all the countries in the region by interconnecting regional gas markets. Thus, Turkey is in favor of this support plan.

In addition to the investment in gas, Turkey also supports the investment of the EU in developing the broadband internet. The internet accessibility needs to be improved in some part of the country, especially in the rural areas. To make people living in these areas to be more informed about the global development, the use of internet is a crucial factor to be introduced. The improvement of the infrastructure of internet such as the fiber optic cables remains as a very necessary task for Turkey. So, allocating 1 billion Euros to develop this sector is very important and supportive for Turkey. This can be used in cooperation with the universities in order to facilitate the process with scientific researches.

As a final point of interest, Turkey also gives support to the investment in offshore wind energy for 500 million Euros. Taking into account that Turkey has three maritime sides, developing wind energy opportunities will create important advantages for it. The Ministry of Energy can work in cooperation with the interest groups and private sector companies in order to develop its energy conditions in that context.

All in all, Turkey is in support of the idea of investing in specific sectors for about 5 billion Euros and specifically puts great attention with the energy sector in which it has a crucial role through Nabucco project. The choice of programmes within the energy sector is definitely appropriate for Turkey and the allocation of the financial support into sub-sectors is approved by Turkey as well.

## POSITION OF SLOVAK REPUBLIK

### Main aim of the Commission

- Redistribution of unspent money from EU
- Reduce the impact of the gas crisis with stimulus package

**Slovak republic** fully supported the Commission's Recovery Plan as well as basic ideas of actual proposal to EU stimulus *for* green energy and broadband internet project, but

- does not agree with the total amount of this programme, 5 billion euros from 200 bn. is not enough, we prefer 8 bn. euros
- demands addition of other energy sector as a nuclear energy and a wind energy...
- totally disagrees with allocation of the Money for Slovak republic, only 25 millions euros to project Velky Krtis-Balassagyarmat cannot change actual total dependency of Slovak republic to Russia
- is calling for increasing the amount for Nabucco Project, which can bring independency not only for Central and Eastern Europe to Russia
- and totally agree with importance of internet broadband, especially for rural parts with less than 5%.

### Position of other delegation

Delegation of Slovak republic is aware of importance of support *from* other delegations and of necessity of coalition partners for enforcement of its position. For this reason it distinguishes:

### Possible partners:

- Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Turkey, Nabucco pipe line
- France (nuclear energy)

### Opposite position

- Scandinavian (namely Sweden), Germany, UK

### Preferred outcomes

- change the division of the allocation of the money
- include nuclear energy as a new sector in the proposition
- receive more money to Central and Eastern European countries' projects (for Slovakia-Hungary interconnector) - enforce increase amount to Nabucco project
- raise of total amount

### Negotiation strategy

- make a strong coalition of Central and Eastern Countries (surely with Bulgaria, Hungary, may be Poland, Czech republic) to support the Nabucco Project and more money to our countries
- make a coalition with France about support of nuclear energy
- demand Czech presidency to organise separate bilateral meeting with those countries
- meet with representatives from Nabucco's lobby
- try to make the best of close relationship with actual Presidency (Czech republic)

### Stance of to take at the conference

- increasing of given sums by the EU recovery plan
- propose of a new gas facilities such as additional gas interconnector with Romania
- disagree with other links that proposed by UK

## POSITION OF HUNGARY

The main purpose of Hungary is to invest in the Nabucco project. So, we want to achieve some investment for this project and for regional pipe-line between Hungary-Slovakia and maybe also with Slovenia.

*The economical implications for our country could be:*

- huge advantages from the gas pipe-line (as mentioned in our previous meeting in Budapest)

*The political implications:*

- We will gain at image and prestige
- Internal implication could be receiving investments for this project and direct access to gas pipe-line

*We know the positions of*

- European Commission — they want to invest in projects for development and for passing this financial crisis
- Green Peace- investments in projects that protect the environment
- Offshore wind energy stakeholder- their main purpose is to achieve the 2020
- Nabucco International- to sustain the Nabucco project with money from the European Union
- CCS stakeholder — they want investments in their field (Carbon capture and storage)

Hungary could make alliance with Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria and Nabucco International. The most different position from ours could be the North European countries, and also the countries that are interested in alternative energy sources.

## GREENPEACE POSITION

### ***OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE EC PROPOSAL:***

The Commission's new Economic Recovery Plan has dual aims: softening the blow of the current global financial crisis and funding the development of energy/technology infrastructure for the EU's future. The EC's allocation of €5 billion will be split between energy security and information technology concerns. This current distribution of funds is not only misrepresented as investing in a positive energy future, it is severely flawed in its lack of commitment to sustainable energy, with a mere 10% of total funding actually directed toward renewable sources.

### ***IMPLICATIONS FOR GREENPEACE***

EU investments in energy have significant, direct influence on the future of Europe's environmental impact. While support for alternative energy in the form of off-shore wind technology is a positive step, the current budget allocation is extremely lacking in its commitment to renewable resources; of the €3.5 billion designated to EU energy concerns, less than 15% goes toward renewable energy, with the remaining 85% oriented toward a futile attempt to save carbon-based energy sources. If the EU continues this vast disproportionate funding of soon-to-be-obsolete fossil fuel energy, Greenpeace foresees the continuation of inappropriate carbon dependence that will have dire consequences for our Earth and the future of humanity.

### ***OUR CORE COMMITMENTS:***

*As stated in our international website,*

- We bear witness to environmental destruction in a peaceful, non-violent manner;
- We use non-violent confrontation to raise the level and quality of public debate;
- In exposing threats to the environment and finding solutions we have no permanent allies or adversaries;
- We ensure our financial independence from political or commercial interests;
- We seek solutions for, and promote open, informed debate about society's environmental choices.

### ***OUR MESSAGE TO THE EC:***

GREENPEACE refuses to stand idly by as the EC makes decisions that perpetuate the destruction of our planet. In their futile attempt to save outdated carbon energy, Europe is sealing its own fate by dooming its member states to a future of dependence and environmental degradation that will only end in disaster. Rather than paying lip service to environmental concerns with insignificant financial commitments to green technology, the EC must decisively act now to set a global example with bold investments in renewable energy and green agriculture. Centuries of political complacency to carbon dependence has wreaked havoc on our planet and jeopardized the future of all mankind. We demand that the EU take a united stand against impending environmental catastrophe, asserting its global leadership by declaring its uncompromising support of a green, sustainable future.

### ***OUR OBJECTIVES:***

#### ***• Primary objectives:***

- Reallocation of the €3.5 billion package
- 75% of new funding directed toward diversified renewable energy efforts
- 25% of new funding directed toward improving energy efficiency and green agricultural techniques

#### ***• Secondary objectives:***

- Increased funding for energy and agriculture within the Economic Recovery Plan
- Funding for sustainable energy techniques should ideally comprise 100% of the €5 billion allocation

### ***TACTICS:***

GREENPEACE intends to use a full range of lobbying techniques to speak for a future of sustainable energy, environmental awareness, and protection of our planet.

- Individual/group meetings with other interest groups
- Pursuit of letter of solidarity with like-minded organizations
- Individual/group meetings with EC delegations
- Presentation of petitions/public opinion campaigns from EU member states
- Strong demonstrations for environmental awareness to ensure visibility of environmental concerns
- Interviews with members of the Press
- Public Awareness campaigns that educate and inform EU constituencies to pressure their EC representatives to support environmental energy and agricultural reforms

### **POTENTIAL FOR COLLABORATION:**

**GREENPACE** is eager to work with any organizations/delegations who express their strong commitment to a sustainable future.

#### ***Offshore Wind Potential***

- 120,000 sq km — United Kingdom
- 90,000 sq km -- Norway
- 40,000 sq km — Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Italy, France
- 20,000 sq km — Cyprus, Bulgaria, Belgium, Slovenia, Romania, Portugal, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia

#### ***Leading MS in Present Planned Offshore Wind Projects***

- UK, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands

#### ***Major Contributors to EU Agriculture***

- France (18.7%), Germany (13.1%), Italy (12.5%), Spain (11.4%)

*% of 2008 EU agricultural production, provided by EC statistics  
[http://ee.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2008/itable\\_en/en31.htm](http://ee.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2008/itable_en/en31.htm)*

#### ***Notable Delegations***

- *Poland, Eastern Europe Bloc* — Renewable energy would provide a permanent path to energy independence and security from reliance on Russian fossil fuels.
- *UK, France, Germany, Netherlands* — Major power players whose advanced economies have the best capacity for rapid progress in renewable energy.
- *Turkey* — Significant stakeholder in development of Nabucco Pipeline; likely opposed to energy independence as this would weaken its assets as a potential EU member.

#### ***Analysis of Lobby Positions***

- *Off-shore Wind Lobby* — We support their advocacy for renewable wind power.
- *CCS Lobby* — CCS is a futile attempt to save a doomed, environmentally destructive carbon industry; the EU must take decisive steps to install renewable energy.
- CCS stakeholders: Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Portugal, UK
- *Nabucco Lobby* — Continued fossil fuel dependence is a grave error that must not be perpetuated by new EC funding.
  - MS stakeholders: Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania

## POSITION OF EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION

Responsibility under the Recovery Plan is shared so that the Commission and all Member States play mutually reinforcing roles. No-one can tackle this crisis unilaterally. Coordination is the key.

**Our main** arguments why significant financial aid should be given to offshore wind projects:

Wind energy will play an essential role *in meeting* the EU's target for 20% renewable energy by 2020 and achieving a secure, environmentally friendly and affordable supply of energy for European citizens and businesses.

The wind resources over Europe's seas represent a vast, indigenous source of clean, renewable energy. By generating electricity without fossil fuel and by creating jobs and growth in a sector in which European businesses are global leaders, offshore wind can make a *significant contribution to all three key objectives* of the EU's new energy policy: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, ensuring security of supply and improving EU competitiveness.

Wind power investments carry *more economic certainty* than other energy investments since investors are not exposed to unpredictable fuel and carbon prices.

We believe that it is important to combine the short-term economic and fiscal measures in the Recovery Plan with longer "smart investments" in research and development to lay down a strong base for the future competitiveness of European industry. We need strong cooperation between stakeholders and a coordinated approach at European level to develop the sustainable technologies that *will allow Europe to move forward towards a low-carbon, knowledge-based economy*.

The Recovery Plan includes a smart response of the crisis which *will also boost the fight against climate change by speeding up investment in efficiency and clean technologies*. This will create jobs in both the short and longer-term and help give Europe a first mover advantage which will pay dividends in terms of economic growth, security and environmental sustainability.

We think that financial support for gas and carbon capture and storage projects would be used for infrastructure projects that are environmentally costly, have better alternatives, or are not sustainable in the long run.

Today's winners are the giant companies that monopolise the energy market. They will try and make the most of the huge sums that have been secured for the projects for which they have lobbied. Spending billions on carbon capture and storage projects is a mistake, given that this technology will deliver few jobs or technological results in the near future.

Offshore wind technologies down the road that are not competitive yet but have a lot going for them.

Committing EU funds to promote offshore wind energy represents wise long-term thinking.

First generation of North Sea offshore wind farms is already creating jobs, pumping increasing amounts of non-polluting electricity into European households and businesses, and helping reduce Europe's dependence on costly and imported fuels.

Commission's proposal to dedicate Euros 500 mn to help finance offshore wind should allow even larger volumes of wind-generated electricity to be integrated quickly into the existing grid, provide new R&D opportunities to make the power sector more efficient and less expensive, improve operations and maintenance, and speed up market deployment.

Making Europe's interconnectors more efficient and improving the electrical grid will not just help speed the development of offshore wind power. *A more efficient internal electrical market will benefit consumers through cheaper prices.*

The wind industry alone is expected to contribute towards delivering 12-14% of EU electrical demand within 12 years, with more than one-quarter of that coming from offshore wind. By 2030, the contribution of offshore wind alone is expected to reach close to 15% of total EU electrical production.

*Support should be given to projects already at a reasonable state of development on the basis of the ability for the EU to bring real added value to them. The selected projects should have a cross-border significance, be situated in deeper waters and further from shore to reap benefit from high wind resources potential.*

**Potential allies:**

- Greenpeace,
- countries having access to the sea and deep traditions in such projects (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Poland, UK, Netherlands, Ireland).

**Different positions:**

countries with no access to the sea and no traditions (Hungary, Slovakia; Italy, Bulgaria).

**Negotiating strategy:**

- giving interviews to press;
- influencing national delegations which do not have big interest in financing such projects.

Our **highest** expected result: 800 mln eur for offshore wind projects

**Lowest:** 350 mln eur.

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**EVALUATION**

A feedback was organised at the end of each week to evaluate the satisfaction of the students and try to propose some modifications in case of complains

On the other hand a questionnaire was distributed to the students and the examination shows a global satisfaction despite some small points of critique.

After examination of the questionnaires, some propositions appear, more or less the same as during the oral feedback

**Lunch break :**

The scheduled time for the start of the morning session was suitable for the students and the lecturers. Although students were complaining about the 1 hour lunch break on the basis that they did not have the opportunity to visit the library.

Instead of longer lunch breaks, probably it would be more reasonable to have free afternoon sessions to use the university's facilities, and some more free time for the personal visits in order to prepare the presentations of each group.

**Reading Package:** Students were provided a web page where they could access the reading material to prepare for the lectures.

**Accommodation for the students:** Tophane Dormitory was found suitable by the students but 8 students staying in the same room is too much.

**Meals:**

Breakfast and lunch, which were served at the Dolapdere campus cafeteria, were very well liked by the students. Lunch cards were very appropriate for the occasion even if the students found the amount a little bit insufficient. On the other hand per diem were given to all the students for dinner

**Shuttles:**

because of the localisation of the dormitory, a Shuttle service organised. It was very good and appropriate.

**Classrooms:**

Two rooms were used for the lectures, for the simulation preparation and play. The size and the technical equipment in was very appropriate for the structure of the lectures

**Students**

Students developed friendly relations among themselves. The overall language and academic capacities of the students were sufficient for the program.

**Courses and Lecturers:**

Although students were already informed about the contents of the session in advance, there were still some complaints that they would have preferred more classes centered on Turkey. However, it should be noted that out of the 19 lectures, including debates and roundtable discussions, there were 13 sessions that were directly linked to Turkey. The students' complaints that Turkey was not included in some of the lectures, particularly those on EU history, polity and internal and external policies could be due to lecturers' hesitance to answer questions on Turkey.

On the other hand, some other students complain that the programme was more oriented towards Turkey than towards Europe.

So the topics about Europe and its history must maintain, even if Turkey must be more important in the programme.

The organisation of debates must be improved to permit more participation of the students in these discussions.

**Cultural Visits and presentations :**

The cultural visits were appropriate for the subject of the program. Students really enjoyed meeting with prominent people from different religious communities.

Presentations were scheduled at the end of the program but some corresponding visits were also organised at the end of the programme, in that case the students did not have enough time to work as a group.

Perhaps, the presentations should be organised each week after the corresponding exploration visits instead of a whole day at the end of the programme.

**Free time :**

Students wished to have at least one free day and one free afternoon to enable them to make their personal visits and to encourage group activities including the presentation preparations.

**Simulation:**

Student complained of the work load of the simulation, such as the required readings and position papers.

Additionally, scheduling the simulation after the presentations and the oral exams distracted the students from this activity.

Already, the organisers decided to not organise a simulation in the programme of the 2010's session.

**ECTS Credits:**

The Turkish students complain about the requirements for obtaining ECTS that they never knew before the opening session, but just after the details information given by the director of the Summer University Programme of CIFE. Nevertheless, an official regulation is proposed on the CIFE website. So the Turkish partner has to inform the students about the opportunity to obtain ECTS Credits and to visit the website to know the necessary obligations. No foreign student complains for that because they were informed by the CIFE when applying.

## SUMMER UNIVERSITY ORGANISATION

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Robert Bosch **Stiftung**